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A key choice that must be made by a new or young university is that of the
selected balance between research and teaching on the continuum of options.
We approach this choice from a strategic decision-making perspective, by im-
plementing a game theory approach to analyse the selection process. Three
main groups of players were identified: faculty members or academicians,
university management members, and board of trustees’ members. The de-
cisions of these players were then analysed by the use of a Fuzzy TOPSIS
method. Our findings show how, in choosing from the options continuum,
the players arrived at equilibria points that best satisfied their collective per-
spectives as to the required balance, for the purpose of achieving optimal
benefit.
keywords: Game Theory, Strategic-Decision Making Process, Fuzzy TOP-
SIS Method, Research/Teaching Continuum.
1 Introduction
The creation and maintenance of effective strategies constitute one of the most important
steps leading to organizational success (Garbuio et al., 2015). Scholars have sought to
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understand how organizations make decisions within complex environments. A success-
ful decision-making process within organizations depends on a range of criteria, such as
relevant information, the identification of constraints, the application of effective man-
agement techniques (Elbanna and Child, 2007), including managerial control (Elbanna,
2016); organizational cultural values (Hatch, 1993); management intuition (Miller and
Ireland, 2005); and internal organizational politics (Pfeffer, 1992; Wilson 2003; Ferris
et al. 2007; Hung et al. 2012). It is well documented that the extent to which decision
making processes are truly strategic impacts process efficiency and decision effectiveness
(Rodrigues and Hickson, 1995; Elbanna and Child, 2007). Faculty members may be
required to “publish or perish”; to ensure the success of their students, as reflected in
relatively high retention and graduation rates; to engage in research-driven or informed
teaching; or to emphasize the achievement of expected course and program outcomes,
The decision as to the balance to strike between research and teaching orientations may
be difficult for many new or young universities, where the business environment offers
sufficient degrees of freedom. Any balance struck implies distinctive advantages and
disadvantages, with significant potential impact upon institutional survival. Multiple
factors must be considered. Once an initial choice is made, some universities may suf-
fer from institutional inertia, or primarily focus on reputation and resources to remain
afloat (Rousseau, 2012). Arguably, one of the most important criteria consists of the
assurance of stakeholder satisfaction. This study approaches the “research or teaching
orientation” decision from a game theory perspective, and identifies outcomes from each
choice made. Young universities are chosen for the purpose of this study. Three main
players are identified; academicians, managerial staff Dean, Vice Deans, Vice Rectors
and Rectors or Presidents, and Boards of Trustees. Under time pressure, the three play-
ers, who may have different priorities and agendas, must attempt to decide upon the
course of action most beneficial for a young university. This study will also shed light
upon the decision that should be made by such universities, in cases where business
environment and resource constraints allow sufficient decision-making flexibility. It pro-
vides an understanding of how, under such conditions, the best possible decisions can be
identified, so as to ensure long-term survival. In order to conduct the required analysis
a fuzzy topsis methodology is implemented. Such a technique for order preference by
similarity to ideal situation (topsis) can help in objective and systematic evaluation of
multiple criteria. In the topsis approach, an alternative that is nearest to the fuzzy
positive ideal solution and farthest from the fuzzy negative ideal solution is chosen as
optimal. The former is composed of the best performance values for each alternative
whereas the latter consists of the worst performance values. By way of a basic defini-
tion, a fuzzy set a in a universe of discourse X is characterized by a membership function
µ ∼ a(x) that maps each element x in X to a real number in the interval [0, 1]. The
function value µ ∼ a(x) is termed the grade of membership of x in ∼ a. The nearer the
value of µ ∼ a(x) to unity, the higher the grade of membership of x in ∼ a (Jiang et al.,
2008).
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2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Strategic Decision Making Process
Strategic decision making processes can be described as “committing substantial re-
sources setting precedents and creating waves of lesser decisions” (Mintzberg et al.,
1976). There are three main perspectives on strategic decision-making process: ratio-
nality, bounded rationality and garbage can model (Schalk et al., 2013). Power, politics
and cognitive factors play an important role (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). Successful
strategies increasingly rely on structure (Osborn, 1998). One of the biggest challenges
for managers is to cope with environmental uncertainty, and successful decision-making
process helps firms to reduce uncertainty (Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013). In addition,
high performance within organisations rely on decision makers “ability to reduce tension
between flexibility and efficiency”(Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). Senior management
teams make strategic decisions that impact on organizational performance (Amason,
1996). Such decisions require the commitment of substantial resources and contribute
to either survival or failure. It is difficult to define or assess the outcomes of strategic
decisions as they involve different trade-offs and risks. Organizational decisions may be
split into the broad categories of content and process. The first category focuses on strat-
egy content such as investment, portfolio management and investment decisions. The
second set deals with issues of how strategic decisions are made and factors influencing
them (Elbanna, 2006). The effectiveness of strategic decision-making processes depends
on multiple criteria. One of the key ingredients of effective decision-making is to be
evidence-based. Every decision-making process should primarily rely on either existing
qualitative or quantitative data (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006). In addition, it is apparent
that evidence based management practices are quite effective when business schools are
designed (Rousseau, 2012). Strategic-decision making choices must also consider possible
outcomes (Garbuio et al., 2015).
On of the other important factors that impact strategic decision-making process effec-
tiveness consists of environmental circumstances (McKelvie et al., 2011). For instance,
market uncertainty implies unpredictable and unstable conditions. In such a context nei-
ther outcomes nor probabilities can be foreseen. These issues are particularly important
in the early stage of strategic decision making process and more relevant to technology-
based ventures (Reymen et al., 2015). In response to market uncertainty, decision-makers
may adopt either planning or adaptive approaches. In the first case, they focus upon
detailed internal and external environmental analysis for planning purposes, whereas in
the latter situation, incremental actions may be implemented as a means of responding
to uncertain and unknown situations, without formal planning (Wiltbank et al., 2006).
2.2 Game Theory
Game theory is a mathematical system that is implemented to understand and analyze
how human being behave in strategically. Von Neumann and Morgenstern outlined the
main features of the game theory in 1944. A few years later the mathematician John Nash
proposed a solution to the problem that as to how rational player would behave, leading
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to Nash equilibrium. He contented that all players would adjust their response according
to those of players until none of could benefit from changing. In final step all players
would choose their strategies that are best responded to others’ strategies (Camerer,
2003). Game theory becomes relevant when there is interdependence among players.
It means one player’s choice dependent on the choice that others made (Johnson et al.,
2013). One of the base assumptions in the game is that the players would eventually meet
at an equilibrium point if they behave rationally. However, in many experiments it is seen
that they are not in an equilibrium point. This is because a player may wrongly perceived
other players beliefs. Therefore, cannot precisely predict the outcomes (Camerer et al.,
2004). Furthermore, in a minimal social situation game theory can be one of the best
tools to analyse strategic choices and outcomes (Colman, 2013). Nonetheless, eventually,
the game theory is about group thinking or more precisely how best to predict what other
people will do in a specific given situation (Camerer et al., 2004).
3 Conclusion
The results showed a significant relationship between organizational culture, Accred-
itation cost and strategic intention. Based on fuzzy logic simulation, private higher-
education institution should move from hesitation due to costly accreditation require-
ments to realizing the benefits of having implemented risk management towards adopting
international activities such as international accreditation. In conclusion, based on the
research problem addressed, the findings suggest that Jordanian private universities need
to make more reliable and implementable strategies by taking into consideration envi-
ronmental conditions. More specifically, universities should make some changes in term
of decision making, especially in respect to international accreditation. This could be
accomplished by allowing subordinates to contribute to decision making and allowing
them to put forth their observations regarding environmental conditions. Practically,
private university leaders should involve subordinates in decision-making, and leaders in
private universities should encourage subordinates to act upon new changes.
3.1 Fuzzy TOPSIS
Fuzzy TOPSIS is a technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (Wu
et al., 2007). Simply stated, it is in very core; the furthest possible distance from neg-
ative solution and the closest solution to a positive outcome. In that, fuzzy positive
ideal solution (FPIS) and fuzzy negative ideal solution (FNIS) are calculated. It is a
multi-criteria solution that helps to identify the most appropriate resolution from a set
of options (Aplak and Sogut, 2013). In fuzzy TOPSIS methodology weights of all criteria
are assessed with linguistic terms that are represented by fuzzy numbers. The values
of each criterion converted into dimensionless indices. By doing so, the compatibility
between the values of objective criteria and the linguistic ratings of subjective criteria
is ensured (Chu and Lin, 2003). This is proposed by Hsu and Chen (1997). Objective
attributes have numerical values and subjective attributes have qualitative descriptions
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(Chu and Lin, 2003). A linguistic value is identified as a variable and they are trans-
formed in to a questionnaire (Aplak and Sogut, 2013). It is claimed that in appropriately
set games, across a majority of scenarios, fuzzy agents win more often than normally
expected (Oderanti and De Wilde, 2010).
3.2 Research or Teaching Oriented Universities
There has been much discussion as to whether, when the immediate business environment
is held constant or neutral, a university should be primarily focused on teaching or
research, or should simply emphasize both simultaneously (Cummings and Shin, 2014).
A research orientation generally contributes to institutional prestige (Armstrong and
Sperry, 1994). In his well-noted writings Boyer (1991), (1996) contended that more
attention should be given to scholarship of dissemination and integration and also that
universities should engage more robustly with real life problem solving applied research.
4 Methodology
Behavioral models of the games are meant to be very general. Developed models can
be applied to many different games with little adjustment (Camerer, 2003). For the
purpose of the study three different players from a newly founded-less than ten years
old- university is identified. Academics, management and board of trustees. Those three
players are on the constant competition for the limited resources and they may have
different priorities. Three possible outcomes are also discussed. Being teaching, research
or teaching/research oriented. In order to identify evaluation criteria. The Times best
universities criteria are implemented. This tool uses one of the most trustable criteria
available as it has been developed for participation of different participant. It also relies
on statistical analysis which make it more robust. We identified 13 different criteria
from The Times best universities ranking tool. The players are asked which one of those
criteria are more relevant and important in different circumstances. The criteria are
taken from The Times the best universities list and implemented for the purpose of this
research are:
• Research Income from Industry
• Ratio of International to Domestic Staff
• Ratio of International to Domestic Students
• Reputational survey (teaching)
• PhDs awards per academic
• Undergraduate admitted per academic
• Income per academic
• PhDs/undergraduate degrees awarded
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• Reputational survey (research)
• Research income (scaled)
• Papers per research and academic staff
• Public research income/ total research income
• Citation impact (normalized average citation per paper)
In order to follow the above criteria Chen and Hwang’s (1992) algorithm of group
multi-criteria decision-making is implemented by the following steps.
Step 1 : Identify the evaluation criteria
Step 2 : Choose appropriate linguistic variables
Step 3 : Aggregate the weight of the criteria to obtain the aggregated fuzzy weight of the
criterion Cj and pool the decision makers’ opinions to obtain the aggregated fuzzy
rating Xij of alternative Ai under criterion Cj
Step 4 : Construct the fuzzy decision matrix
Step 5 : Construct the normalized fuzzy decision matrix
Step 6 : Construct the weighted normalized fuzzy decision matrix
Step 7 : Determine the FPIS (Fuzzy Positive Ideal Solution) and FNIS (Fuzzy Negative
deal Solution)
Step 8 : Compute the distance of each alternative from FPIS and FNIS (using Euclidean
distance function)
Step 9 : Compute the closeness coefficient of each alternative
Step 10 : Determine the ranking order of all of the alternatives according to the closeness
coefficient.
Assume that the decision group has K members (nine in our study). If the fuzzy
rating and importance weight of the kth decision maker about the ith alternative on
the jth criteria (thirteen criteria in our study) are denoted by X˜kij = (a
k
ij , b
k
ij , c
k
ij) and
W˜ kij = (W
k
j1,W
k
j2,W
k
j3) where i = 1, 2, ...,m and j = 1, 2, ..., n then the fuzzy ratings X˜ij
of alternatives (i) with respect to each criteria (j) are given by X˜ij = (aij , bij , cij) such
that aij is the minimum, bij is the weighted average and cij is the maximum of their
values, as in equation (1).
aij = mink(a
k
ij); bij =
1
K
K∑
k=1
bkijacij; cij = maxk(c
k
ij) (1)
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The aggregated fuzzy weights W˜ij of each criterion are calculated as: (W
k
j1,W
k
j2,W
k
j3)
such that W kj1 is the minimum,W
k
j2 is the weighted average and W
k
j3 is the maximum of
their values in equation (2).
wj1 = mink(wkj1);wj2 =
1
K
K∑
k=1
wkj2;wj3 = maxk(wkj3) (2)
A fuzzy multicriteria Group Decision Making (GDM) problem can be expressed in
following matrix format, as in equations (3) and (4).
... C1 C2 ... Cn
A1 x˜11 x˜12 ... x˜1n
D = A2 x˜21 x˜2 ... x˜2n
: : : : :
Am x˜m1 x˜m2 ... x˜mn
(3)
W˜ = (W˜1, W˜2, ..., W˜n) (4)
where X˜kij for all i, j and w˜j i= 1, 2, , m and j = 1, 2, .., n are linguistic variables that
can be described by triangular fuzzy numbers; X˜ij = (aij , bij , cij) and (W
k
j1,W
k
j2,W
k
j3).
The linear scale transformation is used to transform various criteria scales into a
comparable scale. Thus, the normalized fuzzy decision matrix can be represented by R˜
, which is an matrix m× n, as shown in equation (5). The below normalization method
preserves the property that ranges of normalized triangular fuzzy numbers belong to [0,
1].
R˜ = [r˜ij ]m×n (5)
where i=1, 2, , m. and j=1, 2, ,n.
r˜ij = (
aij
c∗j
,
bij
c∗j
,
cij
c∗j
); c∗j = maxi(cij) (Benefit Criteria) (6)
r˜ij = (
aj
cij
,
aj
cij
,
aj
cij
); aj = mini(aij) (Cost Criteria) (7)
The weighted normalized fuzzy decision matrix (which is an matrix) is calculated
by multiplying the weights of the evaluation criteria and the normalized fuzzy decision
matrix, as shown in statement (8). This computation considers the importance of each
criterion.
R˜ = [v˜ij ]m×n = [r˜ij ]m×n × w˜j ; i = 1, 2, ...,m and j = 1, 2, ..., n (8)
The FPIS and FNIS of the alternatives (strategies in our study) are defined as shown
in equations (9) and (10).
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A+ = (v˜+1 , v˜
+
2 , ..., v˜
+
n ), where v˜
+
j = maxi(vij3) j = 1, 2, ...,m and i = 1, 2, ..., n
(9)
A− = (v˜−1 , v˜
−
2 , ..., v˜
−
n ), where v˜
−
j = maxi(vij1) j = 1, 2, ...,m and i = 1, 2, ..., n
(10)
The next step is to calculate the distance of each weighted alternative from the fuzzy
positive ideal solution (FPIS) and the fuzzy negative ideal solution (FPNS), as shown
in equations (11) and (12).
d+i =
n∑
j=1
dv(v˜ij , v˜
+
j ), i = 1, 2, ...,m (11)
d−i =
n∑
j=1
dv(v˜ij , v˜
−
j ), i = 1, 2, ...,m (12)
where dv(a, b) is the distance measurement between the two fuzzy numbers a and
b. The closeness coefficient represents the distances to the FPIS and the FNIS. The
closeness coefficient CCi of each alternative is calculated as shown is equation (13).
CCi =
d−i
d−i + d
+
i
, i = 1, 2, ...,m (13)
For the last step, we rank the alternatives according to the relative closeness to the
ideal solution. The greater value of CCi is, the better the alternative Ai is. The best
alternative is the one with the greatest relative closeness to the ideal solution.
5 Nash equilibrium for a three-person non-constant game
In a three player game (Player 1, Player 2 and Player 3), a Nash equilibrium is a pair
of strategies (A, B, C) such that A is an optimal strategy (best response) for Player 1
against B and C where B is an optimal strategy (best response) for player 2 and C is
an optimal strategy for player 3 against A. In another words, Nash equilibrium is a pair
of strategies, one for each player that has the property that no player can unilaterally
change his/her strategy and obtain a better outcome.
Steps to find the Nash equilibrium:
Step 1 : Assume the role of one of the players - Player 1
Step 2 : Assume that your opponent (if it is a three-player game, the other players) picks
a particular action or strategy.
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Table 1: Strategy for Management, Academic Staff and Board of Trustee
Notation Strategies
S1 Teaching (>70%)
S2 Research (>70%)
S3 Teaching and Research
Step 3 : Determine your best action or strategy given your opponents’ actions and un-
derline the outcome of the best strategy in the payoff matrix.
Step 4 : Repeat Steps 1 through 4 for each player of the game (for Player 2 and Player 3)
Step 5 : Any entry with all of the numbers underlined is the Nash equilibrium
Table 1 illustrates the strategies of the players, Management members (Player 1),
Academic Staff members (Player 2) and Board of Trustee members (Player 3). Strategies
are same for all players in the game. However, being teacher oriented means that the
main aim of the university is being teaching oriented where research or teaching/research
oriented is neglected. In that we have a criterion that indicate teaching mean 70% of
the working hours of lecturer would be dedicated to teaching activities the same apply
for research. However, research/teaching oriented means that academics spend half of
their available times for teaching and other half for research activities.
In addition, we construct a game in strategic form between three players: Management,
Academic Staff and Board of Trustee. Each player has three strategies, as shown in Table
1. For the next step, to construct a game, we need to calculate the outcomes of the game
(i.e., we need to calculate the outcome when Player 1 chooses strategy S1, the Player 2
chooses S2 and Player 3 chooses S3). To find efficient outcomes, we assume that when
the players select one of their strategies, they thought through the following criteria.
We need an expert opinion in order to determine strategies and criteria for both envi-
ronment and RCS. However, rather than opting for expert opinion we created a decision
making group that are expert on the field. This group consists of nine people who are;
academic members, managerial members and board of trustees members from a newly
founded foundation university. The chosen group also has considerable expertise and
worked various state funded and foundation universities. They asked to fill a question-
naire. The scale is implanted for the purpose of transforming linguistic variables in to
variables that is suggested by Zadeh (1975). For instance, age is a linguistic variable if
its values are assumed to be the fuzzy variables labeled as not young‖, young‖ and very
young‖ rather than the actual numbers.
Since the objectives of players are different or conflicting, importance of criteria are
considered different for them. To make this difference, criteria are requested to be
evaluated by separately for each player. For each criterion, membership functions are
defined as Very Strong Importance‖, Strong Importance‖, Equal Importance‖, Weak
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Table 2: Criteria
Notation Criteria
C1 Research Income from Industry
C2 Ratio of International to Domestic Staff
C3 Ratio of International to Domestic Students
C4 Reputational survey (teaching)
C5 PhDs awards per academic
C6 Undergrad. admitted per academic
C7 Income per academic
C8 PhDs/undergraduate degrees awarded
C9 Reputational survey (research)
C10 Research income (scaled)
C11 Papers per research and academic staff
C12 Public research income/ total research income
C13 Citation impact (normalized average citation per paper)
Importance‖ and Very Weak Importance‖. However, these criteria have different mean-
ings or different degrees of importance for each player. In other words, Table 2 illustrates
each criterion, which are same for each player that helps to select or decide the strategies.
Each decision maker evaluates each criterion using linguistic variables in the question-
naire. The questionnaire asked decision makers to rank the order selection criteria in
terms of their relative importance. In other words, each decision maker decide which
criteria is most important . . . . Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 illustrate decision makers’
evaluation of all criteria according to linguistic variables for Player 1, Player 2 and Player
3 environment, respectively.
Table 3: Fuzzy linguistic terms and fuzzy numbers for criteria importance and strategy
evaluations
Importance Fuzzy Numbers
Very Strong Importance (VSI) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000)
Strong Importance (SI) (0.650, 0.844, 0.894)
Equal Importance (EI) (0.506, 0.650, 0.844)
Weak Importance (WI) (0.164, 0.506, 0.672)
Very Weak Importance (VWI) (0.000, 0.000, 0.506)
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Table 4: Decision makers’ evaluation of criteria according to linguistic variables for
Player 1
Criteria Decision Makers
DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4 DM5 DM6 DM7 DM8 DM9
C1 VSI VSI SI VSI SI EI EI WI WI
C2 VSI VSI SI VSI SI SI EI EI WI
C3 EI VSI SI VSI SI SI SI EI SI
C4 SI VSI VSI VSI SI VSI VSI SI SI
C5 VSI SI SI VSI VSI EI SI EI EI
C6 VSI SI VSI VSI SI EI SI SI SI
C7 VSI EI EI SI EI EI EI SI EI
C8 SI SI SI VSI VSI SI SI EI WI
C9 VSI VSI VSI VSI EI EI VSI SI EI
C10 EI VSI SI SI SI EI EI EI EI
C11 SI SI SI VSI VSI EI SI WI EI
C12 SI VSI SI VSI EI EI EI WI EI
C13 SI SI SI VSI SI VSI SI WI WI
Table 7, Table 8 and 9 illustrates the correspondent fuzzy numbers from the perspec-
tive of Player 1 for each criterion.
Table 10 illustrates the weights of the criteria in TFN form.
Now, we are on the way to analyze strategies according to the stated criteria. In this
step, strategies are compared with competitor player strategies reciprocally. Table 11
illustrates the evaluation of Player 1’ strategies according to C1 in the case of the other
players’ first strategy.
The evaluation of both Player 1’s, Player 2’s and Player 3’s strategies according to each
criterion done separately. In other words, methodology is applied for all combinations
of players’ strategies. Table 11 is only an example for this evaluation.
Table 12, Table 13 and Table 14 illustrate (Player 1’s strategies) fuzzy decision matrix
of all criteria (S1 Case). Again, the methodology is applied for all combinations.
Table 15 illustrates Player 1’s ideal solutions for S1 case includes positive and negative
effect and the matrix is same for all players in the game.
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Table 5: Decision makers’ evaluation of criteria according to linguistic variables for
Player 2
Criteria Decision Makers
DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4 DM5 DM6 DM7 DM8 DM9
C1 EI EI EI SI EI EI EI VSI VSI
C2 SI EI EI EI EI EI WI EI EI
C3 SI EI WI EI SI EI WI EI SI
C4 SI VSI VSI VSI SI VSI WI EI VSI
C5 VSI VSI VSI VSI VSI VWI VSI SI VSI
C6 VSI VSI SI SI SI SI SI EI VSI
C7 VSI VSI SI VSI VSI VSI SI EI VSI
C8 EI VSI EI EI SI SI SI VSI VSI
C9 SI VSI VSI VSI SI EI VSI SI VSI
C10 VSI SI VSI VSI VSI EI SI SI VSI
C11 SI VSI VSI SI VSI EI VSI SI VSI
C12 EI EI EI SI SI EI EI SI SI
C13 VSI VSI VSI VSI SI VSI VSI SI VSI
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Table 6: Decision makers’ evaluation of criteria according to linguistic variables for
Player 3
Criteria Decision Makers
DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4 DM5 DM6 DM7 DM8 DM9
C1 VSI SI VSI VSI SI SI EI SI SI
C2 EI SI EI VSI SI VSI EI EI WI
C3 EI SI SI VSI EI VSI SI EI SI
C4 SI VSI SI VSI SI SI VSI VSI VSI
C5 SI VSI EI VSI SI SI EI EI EI
C6 SI VSI SI WI EI SI VSI EI WI
C7 EI SI SI SI SI EI SI SI SI
C8 EI VSI EI VSI SI VSI SI WI EI
C9 SI VSI VSI VSI VSI SI WI SI VSI
C10 SI SI SI VSI VSI SI EI SI SI
C11 SI VSI SI VSI SI VSI WI EI SI
C12 VSI SI VSI SI SI VSI EI EI EI
C13 SI VSI EI VSI VSI VSI WI WI EI
Table 7: The Correspondent fuzzy numbers used in the criteria evaluation for Player1
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
DM1 (0.844,1.000,1.000) (0.844,1.000,1.000) (0.506,0.672,0.844) (0.672,0.844,0.844) (0.844,1.000,1.000)
DM2 (0.844,1.000,1.000) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844)
DM3 (0.672,0.844,0.894) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844)
DM4 (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000)
DM5 (0.672, 0.844, 0.894) (0.672, 0.844, 0.894) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000)
DM6 (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.894) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844)
DM7 (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844)
DM8 (0.164, 0.506, 0.672) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844)
DM9 (0.164, 0.506, 0.672) (0.164, 0.506, 0.672) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844)
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Table 8: The Correspondent fuzzy numbers used in the criteria evaluation for Player1
C6 C7 C8 C9
DM1 (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000)
DM2 (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000)
DM3 (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000)
DM4 (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000)
DM5 (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844)
DM6 (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844)
DM7 (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000)
DM8 (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844)
DM9 (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.164, 0.506, 0.672) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844)
Table 9: The Correspondent fuzzy numbers used in the criteria evaluation for Player1
C10 C11 C12 C13
DM1 (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844)
DM2 (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844)
DM3 (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844)
DM4 (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000)
DM5 (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844)
DM6 (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.844, 1.000, 1.000)
DM7 (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.672, 0.844, 0.844)
DM8 (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.164, 0.506, 0.672) (0.164, 0.506, 0.672) (0.164, 0.506, 0.672)
DM9 (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.506, 0.672, 0.844) (0.164, 0.506, 0.672)
Table 10: Criteria fuzzy weight matrix for all players
Criteria Management Academic Staff Board of Trastee
a b c a b c a b c
C1 0.1644 0.7827 1.0000 0.5056 0.7642 1.0000 0.5056 0.8772 1.0000
C2 0.1644 0.8012 1.0000 0.1644 0.6728 0.8939 0.1644 0.7648 1.0000
C3 0.5056 0.8216 1.0000 0.1644 0.6926 0.8939 0.5056 0.8216 1.0000
C4 0.6722 0.9309 1.0000 0.1644 0.8741 1.0000 0.6722 0.9309 1.0000
C5 0.5056 0.8389 1.0000 0.0000 0.8716 1.0000 0.5056 0.8025 1.0000
C6 0.5056 0.8772 1.0000 0.5056 0.8772 1.0000 0.1644 0.7654 1.0000
C7 0.5056 0.7469 1.0000 0.5056 0.9117 1.0000 0.5056 0.8062 0.8939
C8 0.1644 0.8222 1.0000 0.5056 0.8389 1.0000 0.1644 0.8012 1.0000
C9 0.5056 0.8735 1.0000 0.5056 0.9117 1.0000 0.1644 0.8932 1.0000
C10 0.5056 0.7660 1.0000 0.5056 0.9117 1.0000 0.5056 0.8599 1.0000
C11 0.1644 0.8031 1.0000 0.5056 0.9117 1.0000 0.1644 0.8395 1.0000
C12 0.1644 0.7648 1.0000 0.5056 0.7488 0.8939 0.5056 0.8389 1.0000
C13 0.1644 0.8037 1.0000 0.6722 0.9654 1.0000 0.1644 0.8000 1.0000
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Table 11: Player 1’s evaluation according to C1 with linguistic variables (S1 Case)
Criteria
C1
Linguistic variables Correspondent fuzzy Numbers
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
DM1 WI SI SI (0.16, 0.51, 0.67) (0.67, 0.84, 0.89) (0.67, 0.84, 0.89)
DM2 VSI VSI VSI (0.84, 1.00, 1.00) (0.84, 1.00, 1.00) (0.84, 1.00, 1.00)
DM3 EI VSI VSI (0.51, 0.67, 0.84) (0.84, 1.00, 1.00) (0.84, 1.00, 1.00)
DM4 SI VSI SI (0.67, 0.84, 0.89) (0.84, 1.00, 1.00) (0.67, 0.84, 0.89)
DM5 EI EI EI (0.51, 0.67, 0.84) (0.51, 0.67, 0.84) (0.51, 0.67, 0.84)
DM6 SI EI SI (0.67, 0.84, 0.89) (0.51, 0.67, 0.84) (0.67, 0.84, 0.89)
DM7 VWI VSI EI (0.00, 0.00, 0.51) (0.84, 1.00, 1.00) (0.51, 0.67, 0.84)
DM8 EI EI SI (0.51, 0.67, 0.84) (0.51, 0.67, 0.84) (0.67, 0.84, 0.89)
DM9 WI EI WI (0.16, 0.51, 0.67) (0.51, 0.67, 0.84) (0.16, 0.51, 0.67)
Table 12: Player 1’s strategies fuzzy decision matrix for C1, C2, C3, C4 and C5 (S1
Case)
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
S11 0.00 0.64 1.00 0.16 0.75 1.00 0.51 0.80 1.00 0.67 0.91 1.00 0.16 0.76 1.00
S21 0.51 0.84 0.89 0.16 0.73 1.00 0.16 0.69 1.00 0.16 0.75 1.00 0.16 0.80 1.00
S31 0.16 0.80 1.00 0.16 0.77 1.00 0.16 0.75 0.89 0.51 0.88 1.00 0.16 0.75 0.89
Table 13: Player 1’s strategies fuzzy decision matrix for C6, C7, C8, C9 and C10 (S1
Case)
C6 C7 C8 C9 C10
S11 0.51 0.86 1.00 0.51 0.84 1.00 0.16 0.76 1.00 0.16 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.60 1.00
S21 0.00 0.66 0.89 0.51 0.82 1.00 0.16 0.71 1.00 0.16 0.84 1.00 0.51 0.84 1.00
S31 0.16 0.77 1.00 0.51 0.82 1.00 0.51 0.75 1.00 0.51 0.84 1.00 0.16 0.80 1.00
Table 14: Player 1’s strategies fuzzy decision matrix for C11, C12, and C13 (S1 Case)
C11 C12 C13
S11 0.16 0.76 1.00 0.00 0.62 1.00 0.00 0.60 1.00
S21 0.51 0.88 1.00 0.16 0.82 1.00 0.16 0.86 1.00
S31 0.51 0.84 1.00 0.51 0.84 1.00 0.16 0.84 1.00
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Table 15: Player 1’ ideal solutions (S1 Case)
C1 C2 C3 C4 . C12 C13
Positive (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1) . (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1)
Negative (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
Table 16: The distances from FPIS Player 1’ ideal solutions
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 Sum
S11 0,65 0,61 0,47 0,33 0,57 0,45 0,48 0,57 0,58 0,66 0,60 0,65 0,65 7,27
S21 0,57 0,61 0,59 0,54 0,56 0,63 0,48 0,58 0,55 0,48 0,56 0,60 0,59 7,34
S31 0,60 0,60 0,58 0,40 0,57 0,56 0,48 0,48 0,46 0,57 0,56 0,57 0,59 7,04
Table 17: The distances from FNIS Player 1’ ideal solutions
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 Sum
S11 0,64 0,67 0,71 0,80 0,69 0,74 0,70 0,68 0,67 0,63 0,68 0,64 0,64 8,90
S21 0,64 0,67 0,67 0,71 0,70 0,61 0,69 0,67 0,72 0,70 0,71 0,68 0,70 8,87
S31 0,68 0,68 0,63 0,77 0,63 0,70 0,69 0,69 0,73 0,68 0,70 0,69 0,70 8,97
Table 18: Closeness Coefficient for Player 2 (Player 1: Teaching, Player 3: All Strategies)
Player 1 Teaching
Player 3
Teaching Research Teaching & Research
IC Rank IC Rank IC Rank
Player 2 Teaching 0,5955 2 0,5955 3 0,5955 3
Research 0,6475 1 0,6475 2 0,6475 2
Teaching & Research 0,5955 2 0,6515 1 0,6769 1
Table 19: Closeness Coefficient for Player 2 (Player 1: Research, Player 3: All Strategies)
Player 1 Research
Player 3
Teaching Research Teaching & Research
IC Rank IC Rank IC Rank
Player 2 Teaching 0,5955 2 0,5955 3 0,5955 3
Research 0,6475 1 0,7099 1 0,6475 1
Teaching & Research 0,6475 1 0,6475 2 0,6230 2
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Table 20: Closeness Coefficient for Player 2 (Player 1: Teaching & Research, Player 3:
All Strategies)
Player 1 Teaching and Research a
Player 3
Teaching Research Teaching & Research
IC Rank IC Rank IC Rank
Player 2 Teaching 0,5723 2 0,5741 3 0,5955 2
Research 0,6475 1 0,6230 2 0,6475 1
Teaching & Research 0,6475 2 0,6475 1 0,6475 1
Table 21: Payoff Matrix: Player 1 Chooses Strategy Teaching
Player 3
Teaching Research Teaching & Research
Teaching (0.5955, 0.5781, 0.5362) (0.5955, 0.5781, 0.5362) (0.5955, 0.6302, 0.5362)
Player 2 Research (0.5955, 0.5781, 0.5663) (0.6515, 0.5927, 0.6446) (0.6769, 0.7523, 0.6446)
Teaching & Research (0.6475, 0.5927, 0.6165) (0.6475, 0.5927, 0.6165) (0.6475, 0.7523, 0.6165)
Table 22: Payoff Matrix: Player 1 Chooses Strategy Research
Player 3
Teaching Research Teaching & Research
Teaching (0.5955, 0.6302, 0.5362) (0.5955, 0.5781, 0.5663) (0.5955, 0.5781, 0.5362)
Player 2 Research (0.6475, 0.6302, 0.6165) (0.7099, 0.6003, 0.6165) (0.6475, 0.5781, 0.6446)
Teaching & Research (0.6475, 0.8269, 0.6165) (0.6475, 0.6003, 0.6165) (0.6230, 0.5927, 0.6165)
Table 23: Payoff Matrix: Player 1 Chooses Strategy Teaching and Research
Player 3
Teaching Research Teaching & Research
Teaching (0.5723, 0.5781, 0.5362) (0.5741, 0.5781, 0.5663) (0.5955, 0.5781, 0.5362)
Player 2 Research (0.6475, 0.5927, 0.6165) (0.6230, 0.5927, 0.6446) (0.6475, 0.5927, 0.6446)
Teaching & Research (0.6475, 0.5927, 0.6165) (0.6475, 0.5781, 0.6165) (0.6475, 0.5927, 0.6165)
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Table 24: Nash Equilibrium Strategies: Results
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
Teaching Research Teaching & Research
Research Research Teaching
Teaching & Research Research Teaching
Teaching & Research Research Teaching & Research
Teaching & Research Teaching & Research Teaching
Teaching & Research Teaching & Research Teaching & Research
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
Out of three different alternatives in most cases the best option for players are either
opting for being research or research/teaching-oriented. Different options are identified
for each player and most of the cases equilibrium are reached and consequently the
players made their strategies according to knowledge that they have. As a result, in
many cases maximum benefits are achieved when players are chosen to be research
or research/teaching oriented. It should be recognized that the players reached their
decision through the information that readily available to them. It is also interesting
to see during the game academics opted mostly for being teaching/research oriented
whereas management have chosen research orientation.
Arguably, and perhaps not surprisingly board of trustees’ players often supported
both teaching and teaching/research orientations. Out of eighteen options, in different
circumstances and available information, players five times opted for research, four times
for teaching oriented and nine times teaching/ research orientation. One fundamental
conceptual issue in regard to such decision is that the “teaching versus research” decision
is typically not an “either/or” but more a matter of selecting a point on a continuum, in
response to the competitive environment and the resources (especially faculty but also
labs and libraries) available. The standard Carnegie classification of university types il-
lustrates this point. However, given the available information, competitive environment,
and limited resources where an independent school solely relies on tuition fees- players
may be impelled to be very cautious. It may also be that most players conclude that
the university should conduct both activities simultaneously. The standard rationale is
that teaching activities are important for short and medium term survival, but should
be informed by cutting edge research, for the benefit of student learning. However, un-
less academic and other resources suffice to sustain both activities, a tuition-dependent
university could end up losing its reputation and might suffer a substantial decrease
in student enrollment, as a result of such an effort to manage beyond its means. This
may literally make survival impossible. Therefore, each player within the game strives
to maximize his or her benefits with the limited knowledge and resources available.
Further, in practice, environments are usually competitive rather than neutral. Three
points become particularly salient: information, resource availability and the compet-
itive landscape. These significantly impact each player’s decision. The fuzzy TOPSIS
method clearly indicates the best option available for all players. In conclusion, the
fuzzy TOPSIS method makes it evident that even when three main outcome categories
are used for the purposes of simplicity, with three major sets of players, and the com-
petitive environment held neutral, in 50% of the results, these players collectively chose
a combination of teaching and research. This outcome is most notable in the case of
the first player, with 66% of choices falling into this category. Further research might
generate a model that includes a range of teaching and research continuum points, and
allows for the identification of more fine-grained choices, with a dynamic rather than
constant environment.
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